Water Law Review
Volume 18

Issue 1

Article 5

9-1-2014

Man v. Mussel, the Gloves Are Coming off: Supreme Court
Equitable Apportionment and the Tri-State Water Wars
Mitchell S. Ashkenaz

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Mitchell S. Ashkenaz, Man v. Mussel, the Gloves Are Coming off: Supreme Court Equitable Apportionment
and the Tri-State Water Wars, 18 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 1 (2014).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

MAN V. MUSSEL, THE GLOVES ARE COMING OFF:
SUPREME COURT EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT

AND THE TRI-STATE WATER WARS
MITCHELL S. ASHKENAZ*
I. Introduction: A Blue Sign With a White 'W' ........................................

2

11. Tri-State Water Wars ............................................................................

3

3
A . 1925-1950 ................................................
4
B . 1950-1970 ................................................
C . 1970-1990 ................................................
5
6
D .1990-2006 ................................................
8
E .2006-2009 ................................................
9
F.2009-2011 ................................................
10
G .2011-2012 ................................................
11
H . 2013-Present .............................................................................
13
Im. There's More than One Way to Split a River ..............................
A. Interstate Compacts ....................................................................
B. Congressional Allocation ..........................................................
C. Supreme Court Equitable Apportionment ...............................
1. The Beginning (1907-1930) ................................................
Kansas v. Colorado ..............................................................
Wyoning v. Colorado ..........................................................
2. The East (1931) .....................................................................
Connecticut v. Massachusetts ..............................................
N ewJersey v. N ew York ...........................................................
3. The Modem Doctrine (1932-Present) ...............................
Nebraska v. Wyoming .......................................................
Colorado v. New Mexico I ..................................................
Colorado v. New Mexico II .................................................
Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon .....................
IV. Applying Equitable Apportionment to the ACF Basin .......................

13
13
14
15
15
16
16
16
17
17
17
18
19
20
21

A. Supreme Court Procedure .......................................................
B. Getting to the Supreme Court .......................................................
C. Balancing the Factors .................................................................
1. The Water Laws of the States ..............................................
2. The Existence of Established Use .......................................

21
23
25
26
27

*

Third-year student at the University of Tennessee College of Law. I would like to thank the

staff of the UNIVERSrrY OF DENVER WATER LAW REVIEW and Professor Becky Jacobs for reviewing this article and for their helpful suggestions. I would also like to thank my family for all
of their support in law school and in writing this article.

WATER LA WREVIEW

Volume 18

3. Conservation .........................................................................

29

4. Relevance of the Tri-State Water Wars History ..............

32

V. Conclusion ..........................................................................................

33

I. INTRODUCTION: A BLUE SIGN WITH A WHITE 'W'
In the Blue Ridge Mountains of northern Georgia, just south of the Chattahoochee
Gap, a blue sign with a white "W" points to a small spring.'
The spring flows year round, running south through Georgia red clay, past forests
of oak, pine, and fern. Curving along trails and under wooden bridges, various tributaries join its waters and it grows. Further south the stream still grows, from a stream to
a creek, from a creek to a rivulet, from a rivulet to a river-the Chattahoochee.
Some miles south of the Blue Ridge Mountains stands the massive Buford Dam
The 1,630 foot-long rolled-earth dam plugs the Chattahoochee River about fifty miles
north of Atlanta.3 In doing so, the dam creates Lake Sidney Lanier ("Lake Lanier"), a
reservoir and popular recreational destination. 4
The river flows from Lake Lanier-when the dam permits-south towards Atlanta.'
After quenching Atlanta's thirst, the river forges on past dozens of towns and through
dozens more dams."
About ten miles south of Atlanta and forty miles west of the Chattahoochee, another river, the Flint, takes form.7 The sister-rivers parallel one another moving south,
the Chattahoochee along the Georgia-Alabama border, and the Flint through southwest
Georgia.
The sisters meet at Lake Seminole on the Georgia-Florida border.9 Lake Seminole, a reservoir formed by the Jim Woodruff Lock and Dam, empties into the Apalachicola River.'" The river then runs some 118 miles through the Florida panhandle,
ultimately draining into the Apalachicola Bay, an inlet of the Gulf of Mexico." Before
reaching the Gulf, the Apalachicola River feeds a region teeming with more than 1,500
species of plants, over three hundred species of birds, 180 species of fish, close to sixty
species of mammals, and the highest species density of amphibians and reptiles in all

1. Randy Golden, Out of Habersham Chattahoochee River, Part 1, ABOUT NORTH
GEORGIA, http://www.aboutnorthgeorgia.com/ang/Out of-Habersham (last visited Aug. 30,
2014).
2. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, MOBILE DIST., FINAL UPDATED SCOPING REPORT &
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: UPDATE OF THE WATER CONTROL MANUAL FOR THE
APALACHICOLA-CHA'rAHOOCHEE-FLINT (ACF) RIVER BASIN, IN ALABAMA, FLORIDA, AND

GEORGIA 3 (2013), http://www.sam.usace.army.mil/Portals/46/docs/planningenvironmental/acf
docs/IACF%20Scoping%2OReportMar20l3.pdf [hereinafter SCOPING REPORT].

3. Id. at 3, 5.
4. Id. at 4-5.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 3.

Id.
Id. at 2-3.
Id.
Id. at 2, 8.
Id.
Id. at 2.
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of the United States.'" The river's injection of freshwater into the salty Gulf creates an
ideal brackish environment where these thousands of marine species flourish.'3
Tcgether, the three rivers create the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint ("ACF")
River Basin and drain over 19,800 square miles.' Unfortmately, over the years the
ACF Basin has been unable to sufficiently provide for the three states that claim its
water: Georgia, Alabama, and Florida.'" As a result, the states have been fighting the
so-called "Tri-State Water Wars" for over twenty years.' 6 Thus far, private negotiation,
water compacts, and various attempts at litigation have failed to settle the dispute.' 7 As
a result, on October 1, 2013, the State of Florida sought permission from the United
States Supreme Court to sue Georgia, seeking equitable apportionment of the ACF
River Basin water.'" The Court subsequently granted Florida permission to file a complaint on November 3, 2014."
This Article begins in Part II with an in-depth look into why the conflict over the
ACF Basin developed and where the conflict now stands. Part III of the Article summarizes the history of interstate river allocation in the United States, with a special emphasis on Supreme Court equitable apportionment. Finally, Part IV analyzes the likelihood of an equitable apportionment decree in florida v. Georgiaand discusses what
the outcome of a potential apportionment decree may look like.

I. TRI-STATE WATER WARS
A. 1925-1950
District Engineer Colonel R. Park of the United States Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") sat at the headwaters of the Chattahoochee River; he watched the cold freshwater forge south as if nothing could impede its 385-mile journey to the Gulf.
In 1925 the United States Congress sent Colonel Park to the ACF Basin.' He
surveyed the basin for suitable hydroelectric facility sites." In 1939 he issued the "Park
Report,"" which suggested eleven viable hydroelectric locations throughout the ACF
Basin." In the 1946 "Newman Report,"2 ' the Corps determined that of those eleven

12. Apalachicola National Estuarine Research Reserve, Forida, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
EARTH (Oct. 6, 2009, 10:46 AM), http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/15014l/.
13. See id.
14. SCOPING REPORT, supr note 2, at 2.
15. Id. at ES-I toES-4.
16. See id.
at l4.
17. See id.at 13-19.
18. Motion for Leave to File a Complaint at 1,Florida v. Georgia, No. 142, Orig. (U.S. filed
Sept. 25, 2013) thereinafter Fl. Motion] (seeking Supreme Court permission "to file a complaint
against the State of Georgia to equitably apportion the waters of the Apalachicola-ChattahoocheeFlint River Basin").
19. Order Granting Florida's Motion for Leave to File a Bill of Complaint, 135 S.Ct. 471
(2014).
20. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1167 (1lth Cir. 2011).
21. Id.
22. Id.; see also H.R. DOC. No. 76-342 (1939) [hereinafter PARK REPORTI.
23. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig.,
644 F.3d at 1167; PARK REPORT, supra
note 22.
24. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d at 1167; H.R. Doc. No. 80-300
(1947) (hereinafter NEWMAN REPORTI.
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sites, Buford, Georgia, would be the most productive location for a federal hydroelectric
facility."
With the Rivers and Harbors Acts of 19456 and 1946,27 Congress authorized the
Corps to begin construction of a dam at Buford in accordance with the Park and Newman Reports.' Notably, both the Park and Newman Reports described (i) hydroelectricity, (ii) navigation, and (iii) flood control as direct benefits of the Buford Project;
however, whether water supply was an intended purpose of the project was unclear from
the reports.'

B. 1950-1970
Construction of the Buford Dam began in 1950 and the Corps completed the project in 1957." The completion of the dam marked the formation of the approximately
2,515,800 acre-foot Lake Lanier' As the Buford Dam neared completion, the Corps
produced the 1958 Apalachicola River Basin Reservoir Regulation Manual and the
1959 Apalachicola River Basin Reservoir Regulation Manual for Buford Dam."
Together, the manuals formed the master control manual for the Buford Project, describing the technical features and general operating procedures of the Project.' Because the Corps has not updated these manuals since their promulgation, they remain
the current regulation manuals for the ACF Basin and Buford Dam.'
Under the regulation manuals, the Buford Dam must release a sufficient supply of
water such that at least 650 cubic feet per second flow past Atlanta at any time.' In
addition, the Corps granted three Georgia municipalities water supply contracts, allowing them to withdraw water from Lake Lanier and the Chattahoochee River. '
Pertinent to future litigation, Congress passed the Water Supply Act ("WSA") in
1958." The WSA recognized the importance of federal and state cooperation to better
25. NEWMAN REPORT, supra note 24, 69, at 27-28.
26. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-14, 59 Stat. 10 (1945).
27. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-595, 60 Stat. 634 (1946).
28. Id.at 635.
29. See NEWMAN REPORT, supa note 24, 73, at 28-29 (briefly discussing the rapidly expanding population in Atlanta and the fact that the project could serve as a possible water source);
PARK REPORT, supranote 22,
243-6 1,at 78-80 (discussing the potential assets of the project
and assigning a monetary value for each asset, but while mentioning increased water supply, neither concluding it was immediately necessary nor assigning a monetary value for that asset).
30. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160,1169 (11th Cir. 2011).
31. See id. at 1170 (noting various storage capacities in the different levels of the reservoir).
32. Id. at 1171; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, APALACHIcOLA RIVER BASIN RESERVOIR
REGULATION MANUAL (1958) [hereinafter 1958 MANUAL]. The 1959 Reservoir Regulation
Manual for Buford Dan [hereinafter BUFORD MANUAL] was not a separate report. It was in-

cluded as an appendix to the 1958 manual. See id. app. B.
33. InreMDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d at 1171.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.at 1169-70. Two of these water supply contracts were not undeserved: "The creation
of Lake Lanier inundated the water intake structures of the Cities of Buford, Georgia and Gainesville, Georgia. As a method of compensation, the Corps signed relocation agreements with the
two municipalities authorizing water withdrawals directly from the reservoir-these agreements
allowed Gainesville to withdraw 8 million gallons per day ("mgd") and Buford 2 mgd." Id. at
1169 (footnotes omitted). Congress authorized the third water supply contract with Gwinnet
County, Georgia. Id. at 1169-70.
37. Water Supply Act, Pub. L. No. 85-500, 72 Stat. 297 (1958); see also 43 U.S.C. § 390b(O)
(2012).
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promote "water supplies for domestic, municipal, industrial, and other purposes. " ' To
further this purpose, "Congress authorized the Corps to allocate storage in federal reservoirs for water supply, provided that the localities paid for the allocated storage."'
However, the following limitation applied:
Modifications of a reservoir project heretofore authorized, surveyed, planned,
or constructed to include storage as provided by subsection (b) of this section
which would seriously affect the purposes for which the project was authorized, surveyed, planned, or constructed, or which would involve major swuctural or operationalchanges shall be made only upon the approval of Congress
as now provided by law. '
Because Congress enacted the WSA well after the Buford Project began, it did not
directly affect construction. However, the Act would prove to be a major issue for the
future of the project.
C. 1970-1990
By the early 1970s the issues underlying the Tri-State Water Wars began to materialize. In 1974 the Corps completed a final Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS")
"for continued operation and maintenance of the existing Buford Dam." 4 ' According
to the.report, "Ithe Atlanta metropolitan area increased its water use from the river
37% (from 117 mgd. to 160 mgd.)between 1960 and 1968."" Moreover, the population
"within 2 1/4 miles of [Lake Lanier] . . . doubled from the time of completion of the
project in 1956 through 1969.",4 The completion of the EIS was especially timely because northern Georgia experienced a severe drought in the 1980s." Due to Georgia's
growing water needs, the United States Senate commissioned the Metropolitan Atlanta
Area Water Resources Management Study ("MAAWRMS") to develop a plan for the
long-term needs of the Atlanta area.5 As the MAAWRMS proceeded, the Corps entered into various interim water supply contracts with Georgia municipalities, allowing
them to withdraw water from the Buford Project." Because these contracts were interim, the Corps determined the WSA was non-binding and therefore did not require
congressional approval. 7 Notably, all interim contracts between the Corps and the municipalities were set to expire in January 1990."
Ultimately, the Corps determined that the most economical way to solve the water
shortage in Georgia was to reallocate storage space from the Buford Project to water

38. 43 U.S.C. § 390b(a).
39. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d at 1170 (citing 43 U.S.C.
§ 390b(a)).
40. 43 U.S.C. § 390b(e) (emphasis added).
41. In re Tri-State Water Rights Lifig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1322 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
42. Id. (footnote omitted); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, MOBILE DIST., FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: BUFORD DAM AND LAKE SIDNEY [ANIER, GEORGIA

(FLOOD CONTROL, NAVIGATION AND POWER) 14 (1974) Ihereinafter 1974 BUFORD EISI.
43. In re Tri-State Water Rights litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d at 1322 (quoting 1974 BUFORD EIS,

supra note 42, at 15).
44. Seeid at 1324.
45. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1171 (11th Cir. 2011).
46. Seeid. at l171-72.
47. Seeid.atl172.
48. Id. at 1174.
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supply." As a result, in 1989 the Corps issued a Draft Post-Authorization Change Notification Report for The Reallocation of Storage from Hydropower to Water Supply
at Lake Lanier, Georgia ("PAC Report")f ° Among other things, the PAC Report recommended a reallocation of some 207,000 acre-feet from the Buford Project to water
supply, allowing withdrawal from Lake Lanier and from the river downstream of the
Buford Dam." Because the reallocation represented close to a twenty percent increase
from the originally planned water supply storage of the project, the Corps noted in the
PAC Report that if the reallocation constituted a major operational change under the
WSA, the recommendation would require congressional approval. 2
D. 1990-2006
In January 1, 1990-as the Corps' PAC Report reallocation recommendation was
in the process of formalization-a majority of the water supply contracts between the
Corps and the Georgia municipalities expired.' The Corps, however, continued to
allow the municipalities to withdraw water from the Buford Project."4 Georgia's southem neighbors soon took notice and grew concerned with the Corps' apparently Georgia-centric operation of the Buford Project. In June 1990 Alabama filed suit against the
Corps in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ("Alabama district court") challenging the PAC Report's reallocation recommendation and
the "hold-over" municipality water supply contracts. 55 Soon thereafter, Florida and
Georgia moved to intervene as plaintiff and defendant, respectively!, However, before
the court made any ruling, Alabama and the Corps asked to stay proceedings pending
negotiations. 7 The court issued a stay order in 1990, and in 1992 Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, and the Corps entered into a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") to resolve the conflict.5' The MOA required the Corps to reexamine the water supply issues
facing the Georgia and ACF Basin. "
In 1997 the parties entered into the ACF Compact, which replaced the MOA. 0
The compact authorized an ACF Basin Commission composed of the governors of
Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, as well as one non-voting federal government representative.6 ' The commission's goal was to unanimously establish "an allocation formula
for equitably apportioning the surface waters of the ACF Basin among the states" of

49. Id.at 1172.
50. Idat 1173.
51. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS: MOBILE DIST., DRAI-r POST-AUTHORIZATION CHANGE
NOTIFICATION REPORT FOR THE REALLOCATION OF STORAGE FROM HYDROPOWER TO WATER
SUPPLY AT LAKE LANIER, GEORGIA 12 (1989).

52. Id.
53. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d at 1174. All water supply contracts expired except the 1950s contracts with Buford, Georgia, and Gainesville, Georgia. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104, art.
Vl(a)-(b), 111 Stat. 2219, 2221 (1997).
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Alabama, Florida, and Georgia."2 Ultimately, the commission was unable to agree on a
water allocation formula, and the ACF Compact expired in August 2003.'
Meanwhile, in May 2000 Georgia officials sent a formal request ("Georgia's Formal
Request") to the Corps asking pernission (i) to withdraw up to 297 nillion gallons per
day ("mgd") from Lake Lanier by 2030 and (ii) "to provide sufficient releases from the
dam to allow downstream withdrawals of 408 million gallons per day by 2030. " ' The
Corps denied the request, stating that the desired withdrawals would require a reallocation of more than thirty-four percent of the total conservation storage in Lake Lanier
and accordingly would affect the project's authorized purpose under the WSA0 Therefore, the Corps concluded that it could not authorize Georgia's Formal Request without
congressional approval.6 As a consequence, Atlanta, Columbus, Gainesville, Gwinnett
County, DeKalb County, Fulton County, the Appalachian Regional Commission, the
Cobb County-Marietta Water Authority, and the Lake Lanier Association filed their
own suit against the Corps in February 2001 in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia.67
In December 2000 Southeastern Federal Power Customers, Inc. ("SeFPC") also
filed suit against the Corps in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ("D.C. district court")." SeFPC, a group of companies that purchases the power
generated at the Buford Dam from the federal government, claimed that the Corps'
handling of the Buford Project caused SeFPC's members to pay unfairly high rates for
their power.69 The D.C. district court referred the parties to mediation and later added
Georgia as a party; the parties subsequently agreed to a settlement ("D.C. Settlement
Agreement") in January 2003. 7 ' The agreement (i) called for a reallocation of 240,858
acre-feet of the Buford Project to water supply, (ii) created once-renewable ten-year
interim contracts for water supply between the Corps and various Georgia municipalities, and (iii) required the same Georgia municipalities to pay higher rates for water
supply as a credit against the rates charged to SeFPC's members.'
The D.C. Settlement Agreement did not last long, as the Alabama district court
enjoined its filing in October 2003. The Alabama district court found that the agreement violated its 1990 stay order because the parties made it without Alabama and

62. Id. art. VI(g)(12).
63. InreMDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d at 1175.
64. Id. at 1176; Letter from Roy E. Barns, Governor of Ga., to Joseph W. Westphal, Assistant Sec'y of the Army for Civil Works, at I (May 16, 2000) (on file with author).
65. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Lifig., 644 F.3d at 1176; Memorandum from
Earl Stockdale, Deputy Gen. Counsel of Dep't. of the Army, to Acting Asst. Sec'y of the Army
for Civil Works, at 1, 8-9 (Apr. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
66. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d at 1176.
67. Id. at 1165 n.1, 1176; In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d
1308, 1336 (M.D. Fl. 2009); Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 2:01-cv-00026 (N.D.
Ga. filed Feb. 7, 2001).
68. Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera, No. 1:00-cv-2975 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 12,
2000); see also Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera, 301 F. Supp. 2d 26,30 (D.D.C. 2004)
(providing procedural history).
69. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d at 1165, 1175.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1320 (N.D. Ala.
2005).
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Florida's approval.73 Soon thereafter, the D.C. district court approved the D.C. Settlement Agreement but delayed its enactment until the Alabama district court dissolved
its injunction." After the Alabama district court refused to modify or vacate the preliminary injunction, the parties to the D.C. Settlement Agreement appealed the Alabama
injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit." In September 2005 the appeals court vacated the Alabama district court's preliminary injunction;"
the D.C. district court subsequently declared the D.C. Settlement Agreement valid."
Soon after, Alabama and Florida appealed implementation of the D.C. Settlement
Agreement to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit."
In SoutheasternFederalPower Customers,Inc. v. Geren, the D.C. Circuit held that the
settlement agreement exceeded the Corps' authority under the WSA."9 The D.C. Circuit held that "[o]n its face... reallocating more than twenty-two percent... of Lake
Lanier's storage capacity to local consumption uses ... constitutes the type of major
operational change referenced by the WSA." 0 With the appeal pending, the D.C. district court stayed the implementation of the D.C. Settlement Agreement.8
E. 2006-2009
In 2007 the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") transferred the Alabama, Georgia, and SeFPC cases, along with several others, to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. "3 Federal Judge Paul Magnuson of Minnesota, who had previously dealt with complicated water disputes between states, heard
In re T-State Water Rights Litigaon." The parties to the MDL agreed that the court
should consider the claims in two phases.' One phase concerned the Corps' authority
to operate the Buford Project. The other phase concerned the various environmental
implications of the Corps' operation of the Project. 7

73. Id. at 1316.

74. Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera, 301 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35 (D.D.C. 2004).
75. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1121 (11th Cir. 2005).
76. Id. at 1136.

77. Caldera,301 F. Supp. 2d at 35.
78. Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
79. Id.at 1324.
80. Id.

81.

In reTri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Mem-

orandum Order, Se. Fed. Power Customers, Incl v. Caldera, No. 00-2975, 2006 WL 6608801

(D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2006).
82. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d at 1336-37 (stating that MDL combined the following cases: Florida v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 4:06-cv-410 (N.D. Fla. filed
Sept. 9, 2006); Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 1:06-cv-1473 (N.D. Ga. filed Sept. 6,
2006); Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Engr's, No. 2:01-cv-26 (N.D. Ga. filed Feb. 7, 2001);
Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 1:90-cv-1331 (N.D. Ala. 1990)).
83. Id.at 1309.
84. Alyssa S. Lathrop, A Tale of Three States: EquitableAppor'onment ofthe ApalachicolaChattahoochee-FlintRiver Basin, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 865, 873 (2009) ("Judge Magnuson, a
judge from Minnesota, has experience with difficult water battles, having served as a judge in the

complicated Missouri River litigation").
85.
86.
87.

In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d at 1309.
Id.
Id.
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The In re Tn-State WaterRights Lkation court first took up the phase concerning

the Corps' authority to operate the Buford Project."' The fundamental issue concerned
whether, under the WSA, water supply was an authorized purpose of the Buford Project, and if so, whether the Corps' operation of the project amounted to a major structural or operational change from that authorized purpose." Inherent in this question
was whether the Corps' actions with respect to supplying water to the Atlanta and Georgia municipalities required congressional approval.'
After an extensive review of the Buford Project's history, the court concluded that
the only authorized purposes of the Project were flood control, navigation, and hydropower.' The court based this decision on the complicated history of the project, which
indicated to the court that water supply was no more than an incidental benefit of the
project."
Consequently, the court noted that "Itihe Corps' failure to seek congressional authorization for the changes it has wrought in the operation of Buford Dam and Lake
Lanier is an abuse of discretion and contrary to the clear intent of the Water Supply
Act.""3 Accordingly, the court found that the PAC Report's reallocation of water from
the Buford Project and the municipality "hold-over" contracts constituted major operational changes from Buford's authorized purposes that required congressional approval for implementation. 9' Similarly, the Corps would need congressional approval
to fulfill Georgia's Formal Request for water."5
In a court order thatJudge Magnuson conceded was draconian, the court gave the
Corps three years to seek congressional approval for the operational changes it erroneously authorized.96 During those three years, the parties to the litigation could continue
then-current "water-supply withdrawal levels but should not increase those withdrawals
absent the agreement of all other parties."' Without congressional approval, at the
expiration of this three-year period all parties would "return to the 'baseline' operation
of the mid-1970s."98
The court concluded its decision with a censure of the Corps for its slow movement, the local governments for their failure to consider long-term consequences of
their decisions, and the states' citizens for their inability to account for "their consumpton of our scarce resources.""
F. 2009-2011
Before the expiration of the three-year deadline, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit took up Judge Magnuson's ruling in In re MDL-1824 Ti88. Id. at 1310.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id.at 1310, 1321, 1339.
92. Id.at 1344-48 (concluding that the Rivers and Harbors Acts of 1945 and 1946 authorized
the Buford Project in accordance with the Park Report and Newman Report, and because neither
of these reports indicated to the court that water supply was major benefit of the Buford Project,
it was not an authorized purpose of the Buford Project).
93. Id.at 1356.
94. Id.at 1347-53.
95. Id.at 1352-53.
96. Id.at 1355.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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State Water Rights Litgation.' After reviewing the same factual and legislative details
behind the construction of the Buford Project,'"' the appeals court determined that water supply was in fact an authorized purpose of the Buford Project. '2° The appeals court
found that the district court did not give sufficient weight to the value placed on water
supply at the time the 1945 and 1946 Rivers and Harbors Acts and the WSA authorized
the Buford Dam.' 3 As such, the appeals court reversed the district court's ruling, remanded the case, vacated the three year deadline, and gave special instructions to the
Corps to determine the extent of its authority to operate the Buford Project under the
Rivers and Harbors Acts and WSA.' 4°
As to phase two of the MDL litigation, both the district and appeals courts found
discussion of the various environmental implications of the Corp's operation of the
Buford Project unnecessary until phase one concluded."°

G.2011-2012
In June 2012 the United States Supreme Court denied Alabama, Florida, and the
SeFPC's requests to review the Eleventh Circuit's decision.'" Subsequently, the Corps
issued an opinion affirming its legal authority to accommodate both current and increased levels of water supply withdrawals at Lake Lanier and downstream at Atlanta.' 7
However, the Corps noted that
Prior to making any final decision to reallocate storage for water supply, to
implement a new operational scheme, or to implement updated water control
manuals reflecting such decisions, the Corps must further evaluate the environmental effects of the proposed action and reasonable altematives, pursuant
to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to
4370f, with appropriate public participation.' °"
In March 2013 the Corps completed the Final Scoping Report necessary to begin work
In the
on the ACF Basin's EIS and new Master Water Control Operating Manual.'
report, the Corps estimated that updating the EIS and operating manual for the Buford
Project would take approximately three years. '

100. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1165 (11th Cir. 2011).
101. Seeid.at1167-78.
102. Id.at 1192.
103. Id.at 1186-92 (concluding that the Rivers and Harbors Acts of 1945 and 1946 authorized
the Buford Project in accordance with the Park Report and Newman Report, and because both
of these reports indicated to the court that water supply was a major desired benefit of the Buford
Project, it was an authorized purpose of the Buford Project).
104. Id. at 1205.
105. In re Ti-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
106. Adam Thornton, Who Owns the Rain?, I PRop. L.J. 80, 80 n.1 (2014).
107. Memorandum from Earl Stockdale, Deputy Gen. Counsel of Dep't of the Army on
Auth. to Provide Muni. and Indus. Water Supply from Buford Dam/LIke Lanier Project, Georgia, to U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs Chief of Eng'rs (June. 25, 2012), available at http://www
.sam.usace.army.ni/Portals/46/docs/planringenvironmental/acf/docs/
2012ACFjlegalopinion.pdf.
108. Id. at 2 n.4.
109. SCOPING REPORT, supranote 2, at 137-39.
110. Id. at 139.
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Although the EIS and Master Water Control Operating Manual were not yet complete (and are still not complete at the time of this writing), Florida sought permission
from the Supreme Court to file suit against Georgia on October 1, 2013, by filing a
Motion for Leave to File a Complaint ("Motion").'' Specifically, Florida asked the
Court to "cap Georgia's overall depletive water uses at the level then existing on January3
3, 1992.""' This was the date Florida, Alabama, and Georgia entered into the MOA."
In support, Florida asserted that Georgia's consumption in the ACF Basin has and
will continue to cause Florida irreparable economic, environmental, and socioeconomic harm by diminishing freshwater flow to the Apalachicola Bay."' A majority of
the alleged harm stemmed from the inability of the Apalachicola's estuarine ecosystem
to function without sufficient freshwater from the basin."5 When healthy, the Apalachicola Bay is one of the most productive ecosystems in the Gulf of Mexico, home to a
multitude of flora and fauna, including many endangered species."' As such, residents
of the Apalachicola Bay developed a resource-based economy that depends heavily on
the harvest of commercially salable species."' However, significantly reduced flow to
the bay area in recent years resulted in a near collapse of several important Apalachicola
fisheries."' Florida alleged a significant loss of income to the area resulting in job loss
and economic stagnation due to the lack of freshwater flows." 9
The move to petition the Supreme Court came soon after the Department of Commerce declared in 2013 that the Apalachicola oyster fisheries were in a state of commercial fishery disaster.' ° In a statement about the move, Florida Governor Rick Scott
explained, "Georgia has refused to fairly share the waters that flow between our two
states, so to stop Georgia's unmitigated consumption of water we have brought the matter before the U.S. Supreme Court.""'
On February 10, 2014, Georgia filed a response in opposition to Florida's motion." In its response, Georgia claimed that Florida's move to petition the Court should
fail for three key reasons: (i) the move was premature, (ii) the move failed to join an
indispensable party, and (iii) Florida and its citizens were not adversely affected by the

111. Fl. Motion, supra note 18, at 1.
112. Id.at21.
113. Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 24, Florida v. Georgia, No.
142, Orig. (U.S. filed Sept. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Fl. Brief].
114. Florida's Complaint for Equitable Apportionment and Injunctive Relief at 15-21, Florida
v. Georgia, No. 142, Orig. (U.S. filed Sept. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Fl. Complaint].
115. Id. at 10.
116. SeeFl. Brief, supranote 113, at6, 16.
117. Fl. Complaint, supra note 114, at 3.
118. See generallyPemaLevy, Apalachicola Water Wars: A BattleBetween Georgia,Florida
And Alabama Is Killing The Last Great Bay, INT'L Bus. TIMEs (Aug. 23, 2013, 10:18 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/apalachicola-water-wars-battle-between-georgia-florida-alabama-killinglast-great-bay-1394907.
119. Fl. Complaint, supra note 114, at 3 (discussing the economic impact felt by Apalachicola
oyster fishing industry as a result of the Tri-State Water Wars).
120. Levy, supra note 118.
121. Gary Fineout, lorida asks US Supreme Court to stop Georgiia wter use, ATHENS
BANNER HERALD (Oct. 1, 2013, 8:40 PM), h~tp://onlineathens.coi/ocal-news/2013-10-01/florida-asks-us-supreme-court-stop-georgia-water-use.
122. State Of Georgia's Opposition To Florida's Motion For Leave To File A Complaint,
Florida v. Georgia, No. 142, Orig. (U.S. filed Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Ga. Briel].
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direct action of Georgia and thus are not entitled to relief. " Specifically, Georgia asserted that the Court cannot adjudicate the suit before the Corps' promulgation of the
new Master Water Control Operating Manual because any decision the Court makes
must intricately depend on the Manual's allocation formulas." ' Moreover, because the
Corps has played such a significant role in the tangled history of the Tri-State Water
Wars, Georgia asserted that the litigation cannot proceed in the Corps' absence.'"
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Georgia asserted that any harm Florida suffered
due to lack of freshwater was not traceable to Georgia and thus Florida is not entitled
to relief."6
At the request of the Supreme Court,"' on September 18, 2014, the Solicitor General published a short Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae analyzing the TriState Dispute.' In the brief, the Solicitor General opined that, based on Florida's complaint, the state is entitled to an equitable apportionment of the ACF Basin's water
through the Court's exercise of original jurisdiction." However, the Solicitor General
ultimately advised the Court to refrain from taking any action on the apportionment
issue until the Corps completes its updated Master Water Control Manual.'° In support, the Solicitor General noted that equitable apportionment is a complex and expensive procedure.'3' Further, because the Corps' updated manual will directly address
water flow regimes in light of the current ACF controversy, the Solicitor General argued
that the updated manual will be invaluable to the Court in making its decision.''
In spite of Georgia's opposition and in spite of the Solicitor General's brief, on
November 3, 2014, the Supreme Court granted Florida's Motion. ' The Court subsequently appointed Ralph I. Lancaster, an attorney from Portland, Maine, as Special
Master of the case.' As of the publication of this article, the Court's most recent action
was to extend the time in which Georgia is permitted to file an answer until February 2,
2015.''

123. Id. at 16-17.
124. Id. at 1.

125. Id.at 18.
126. Id.at 25-26.
127. Order Calling for the Views of the Solicitor General, 134 S. Ct. 1509 (2014).

128. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Florida v. Georgia, No. 142, Orig.
(U.S. filed Sept. 18, 2014).
129. Ga. Brief, supra note 122, at 13-17.
130.
131.
132.
133.
(2014).

Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 17-20.
Order Granting Florida's Motion for Leave to File a Bill of Complaint, 135 S. Ct. 471

134. Order Appointing Ralph I. Lancaster as Special Master, Florida v. Georgia, No. 142,
Orig. (Nov. 19, 2014), 2014 WL 6473338.
135. Order Granting Extension of Time to File Answer, Florida v. Georgia, No. 142., Orig.

(Nov. 25, 2014). As an unrelated aside, in petitioning the Supreme Court, Florida notes that
"Alabama lies upstream of Florida within the ACF Basin. Although not opposed to Alabama's
participation in this action, Florida asserts no wrongful act by Alabama and seeks no affu-mative
relief against Alabama. Therefore, Alabama is not named in this action." Fl. Complaint, supra
note 114, at 7. For the purposes of this paper, Alabama's role in the potential Supreme Court
issue is not discussed. However, it should be noted that there are various scenarios through which
Alabama may choose or may be required to participate in any further litigation.
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m11.
THERE'S MORE THAN ONE WAY TO SPLIT A RiVER
Historically, the United States has dealt with interstate water disputes in one of
three ways: (i) interstate compacts, (ii) congressional allocation, or (iii) Supreme Court
equitable apportionment." While interstate compacts tend to be the preferred method
to apportion rivers between states, congressional allocation and Supreme Court equitable apportionment remain valid alternatives."'
A. INTERSTATE COMPACTS
Under Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution, compacts between
states are invalid without congressional approval.' 3 An interstate compact allocating
river water or river usage allows the interested states significant input in the terms of the
agreement.' 3 Further, "[alpart from requiring congressional consent, the Constitution
places no limits on what might be done through an interstate compact.' 4 ° If Congress
approves a compact, it codifies the compact as binding federal statutory law.'4 ' It follows
that states will likely accept a compact drafted by the interested states and approved by
Congress. Moreover, compacts tend to be a cheaper method to settle interstate disputes. 42 Interstate compacts, however, have the distinct disadvantage of requiring the
parties involved to reach a unanimous agreement. This requirement may be an insurmountable problem in many cases, such as in the ACF Basin.
B. CONGRESSIONAL ALLOCATION
Congressional authority to allocate interstate river systems derives from the power
to regulate interstate commerce.' s Though congressional allocation provides another
mechanism to apportion water between states, to date Congress has only used congressional allocation twice-in the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928 and in the enactment
of the Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990.' Unlike
interstate compacts, congressional allocation may proceed without unanimous consent
of the states or other parties.'" Generally, this can prevent situations where the dispute
lasts years and years. However, truly interested states tend to disfavor congressional

136. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Law ofEquitableApportionmentRevisited, Updated,and Restated,56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381, 382 (1985).
137. Id.
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any
Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded,
or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.").
139. See Dustin S. Stephenson, The Ti-State Compact Fall'ng Waters andFading Opportunities, 16 J. LAND USE & ENvrL. L. 83, 98-99 (2000).
140. Joseph W. Dellapenna, InterstateStruggles over Rivers: The Southeastern States andthe
Stuggle over the "Hooch',12 N.Y.U. ENIVTL. LJ.828, 833 (2005).
141. Id.
142. C. Hansell Watt, IV,Comment, Who Gets the Hooch?: Georgia,Flonda,andAlabama
Battle for Water from the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
River Basin, 55 MERcER L. REv.
1453, 1458 (2004).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1960); United
States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1956); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock
Co., 339 U.S. 725, 731 (1950).
144. Dellapenna, supra noteo140, at 891-92.
145. Id. at 892.
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allocation, as it leaves important state issues to disinterested and often uninformed
members of Congress.'"
C. SUPREME COURT EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
To date, the Supreme Court has been asked to apportion eight rivers: (i) the Arkansas River, (ii) the Colorado River, (iii) the Connecticut River, (iv) the Vermejo River,
(v) the Walla Walla River, (vi) the Laramie River, (vii) the Delaware River, and (viii) the
North Platte River.' 7 Of those eight rivers, the Court has entered apportionment decrees on only three: (i) the Laramie River, (ii) the Delaware River, and (iii) the North
Platte River.'
Critics of equitable apportionment cite the cost of the process as a major disadvantage. 4" For instance, "the officials involved in the negotiations under the IACF]
Compact estimated the costs of original litigation before the Supreme Court as in the
range of four to six million dollars per year, per state."' Moreover, from beginning to
end, the process can take a very long time; "Itlen years or more is not unusual given the
complexity of the litigation." 5' However, in certain circumstances, equitable apportionment may represent the only feasible option to a problem demanding an answer.
The Supreme Court's authority to settle disputes between states originates in Article III of the United States Constitution: "In all Cases... in which a State shall be Party,
the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction."'55 Generally, when a state litigates
against another, the Court will apply federal common law. 3
Before delving into the history of Supreme Court equitable apportionment, a brief
survey of United States water law is in order. First, it is important to note that water law
is largely state-focused.'54 That is, states generally allocate the water within their borders.
Two distinct water law schemes have developed in the United States.'55 In the western
United States, where water tends to be scarce, states generally observe the prior appropriation doctrine.'56 The prior appropriation doctrine focuses on a "first in time, first in
right" concept.'57 Typically, the first user to divert water from a particular source and
apply it to a beneficial use will have a superior, or senior, right to continue using that
water supply over later or junior users."' In contrast, eastern states tend to follow the
doctrine of riparian rights.'59 So-called "riparian states" associate the right to use water
with ownership of land bordering sources of water."'6 Unlike prior appropriation, the

146. Id. at 892-93.
147. Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Allocation of Rivers Before the United States Supreme
Court The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint'River
System, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 401,404 n.2 5
(2004).
148., Id.
149. ' Watt, supra note 142, at 1457-58.
150. Dellapenna, supra note 140, at 888.
151. Id. at 889.
152. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, el. 2.
153. Colorado v. New Mexico (Coloradov. New Mexico J),459 U.S. 176, 183-84 (1982).
154. SeeJ.B. Ruhl, Equitable Apportionment ofEcosystem Services: New Water Law for a
New WaterAge, 19 J. LAND USE & ENvrL. L. 47, 49 (2003).
155. Lathrop, supra note 84, at 880-81.
156. Id.
157. Ruhl, supra note 154, at 49.
158. Lathrop, supra note 84, at 881.
159. Id.
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riparian doctrine focuses on sharing water sources; each riparian user has a right to use
the water so long as that use does not infringe on the reasonable use of other riparian
Water disputes have long been common in the dry western states, but are
users.'
relatively new to the East.'62 As such, much of the early equitable apportionment case
law involves western prior appropriation states.
1. The Beginning (1907-1930)
Kansas v. Colorado'6
In the 1907 Supreme Court case Kansas v. Colorado,the Court first articulated the
federal common law doctrine of equitable apportionment."' In this case, Kansas sought
to enjoin Colorado's upstream diversion of the Arkansas River." Kansas, a traditional
riparian state at the time, asserted that Colorado's diversion infringed on Kansas' right
to reasonable use of the Arkansas."' Colorado, a prior appropriation state, argued that
it had an absolute right to use the river's entire flow for its own benefit, regardless of any
potential injury to Kansas.'67 Refusing to subject one state to the law of the other, the
Court stated that in disputes between states, "[e]ach state stands on the same level with
all the rest.""' Because no state "can impose its own legislation on . .. others," the
Court presides over the matter, applying "what may not improperly be called interstate
common law."" Though the Court did not articulate a name for the interstate common
law doctrine, the Court rooted the doctrine in the equitable apportionment of benefits
between states.'" To determine how to equitably apportion the benefits of the Arkansas
between the two states, the Court proceeded to balance the benefit to Colorado from
7
water gained with the detriment to Kansas by water loss.' '
Ultimately, the Court dismissed the suit.' The Court explained that Kansas had
no claim, but could re-petition the Court if "it shall appear that, through a material
increase in the depletion of the waters of the Arkansas by Colorado ... the substantial
interests of Kansas are being injured to the extent of destroying the equitable apportionIn denyment of benefits between the two States resulting from the flow of the river."
ing Kansas equitable apportionment of the Arkansas River, the Court established a fundamental concept of equitable apportionment law: the substantial injury test.'"' Under
this test, any state seeking to prevent another from diverting water from an interstate
body through the doctrine of equitable apportionment must prove to the Court that the
diversion currently is causing and will continue to cause injury to that state's substantial
interest."5
161.
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Wyoming v. Colorado'
Wyoming v. Colorado,decided fourteen years after Kansas v. Colorado,is significant for two reasons. First, this case marks the first time the Court's application of the
equitable apportionment doctrine, as defined in Kansas v. Colorado,resulted in an actual allocation of an interstate water source.'" Second, both states followed a prior appropriation scheme."' Because both states followed the same water law doctrine, the
Court held that application of that doctrine to the states' interstate dispute was "eminently just and equitable to all concerned."'.' The Court granted an equitable apportionment decree to Wyoming, which under the doctrine of prior appropriation had the
senior water rights over the disputed Laramie River.' ° Integral to this decision was the
proposition that the Court should adjudicate disputes between states that follow similar
common law water schemes based closely on those water law schemes.
2. The East (1931)
Connecticut v. Massachusetts8
Adjudicated in 1931, Connecticut v. Massachusetts was the first Supreme Court
equitable apportionment case east of the Mississippi and the first between riparian
states.182 Here, Connecticut claimed that Massachusetts' desired diversion of the Connecticut River would cause Connecticut substantial injury by impairing, navigation and
irreparably harming agricultural interests.' 3 Although both states followed riparian law,
the Court backed away from the idea that state water law should hold so significant a
place in Supreme Court equitable apportionmentjurisprudence.' 8' Declining to strictly
abide by riparian law, the Court noted that for the purposes of the equitable apportionment doctrine, "federal, state and international law is to be considered and applied ...
as the exigencies of the particular case may require.""15 Ultimately, the Court determined that Connecticut had not established sufficient injury to warrant apportionment.'86 In doing so, the Court explained it would "not exert its extraordinary power to
control the conduct of one State at the suit of another, unless the threatened invasion87
of rights is of serious magnitude and established by clear and con mr'ncing evidence."'
Thus, the significance of Connecticut v. Massachusettslargely lies in the establishment

176. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
177. Id at495-96.
178. Id.at 458 ("ITlhe same doctrine respecting the diversion and use of the waters of natural
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182. William D. Olcott, Comment, Equitable Apportionment: A JudicialBiidge over Troubled Waters, 66 NEB. L. REV. 734, 739 (1987).
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of a clear and convincing standard required to satisfy the equitable apportionment substantial injury test.
NewJersey v. New York'
Only a few months ater the Connecticutv. Massachusettsdecision, the Court took
on NewJersey v.New York. New Jersey sought to enjoin New York from diverting the
Delaware River for use in New York City.'9 In support of an injunction, New Jersey
9
alleged that New York's diversion would "transgress its rights in many respects." Specifically, New Jersey asserted that the diversion
will increase the salinity of the lower part of the River and of Delaware Bay to
the injury of the oyster industry there. That it will injure the shad fisheries.
That it will do the same to the municipal water supply of the New Jersey towns
and cities on the River. That by lowering the level of the water it will injure
the cultivation of adjoining lands; and finally, that it will injuriously affect the
River for recreational purposes."'
In an opinion authored by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Court found that,
of those alleged transgressions, the effect on recreation, and "the increased salinity of
the River upon the oyster fisheries," were the most pertinent to showing substantial
injury. 9 These "transgressions" are notable as they relate to environmental concerns,
whereas the Court decided the previous apportionment cases primarily based on industrial, agricultural, and anthropogenic concerns. Ultimately, the Court found that the
amount of water New York sought to divert was "greater than New Jersey ought to
bear."'' Accordingly, the Court issued an injunction capping the amount of water New
York could divert from the river.' 1 Further, the injunction required a minimum flow
past New Jersey."' New York bore the burden to maintain the flow, and if it dropped
to a specified level, New York was required to release water from impounding reservoirs."
3. The Modem Doctrine (1932-Present)
Nebraska v. Wyoming'
In 1935 the Court backed even further away from the significance of state water
law to Supreme Court equitable apportionment law. In Nebraska v. Wyoming, Nebraska sought Supreme Court equitable apportionment of the North Platte River between itself, Wyoming, and Colorado. t" Holding that in this case equitable apportionment of the river was warranted, the Court concluded that,
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in determining whether one State is using, or threatening to use, more than its
equitable share of the benefits of aln] [interstate] stream, all of the factors
which create equities in favor of one state or the other must be weighed as of
the date when the controversy is mooted.'"
Thus, in Nebraska v. Wyoming the Court added a totality of circumstances test to equitable apportionmentjurisprudence. The Court explained that after a state establishes
substantial injury, for the Court to then determine whether that injury warrants equitable
apportionment, it would consider not only the litigating states' common law, but also
factors such as
physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several
sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses
on downstream areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former."
This is, of course, a non-exhaustive list. In determining what factors are important, in
each case the Court will analyze "the nature of the problem of apportionment and the
delicate adjustment of interests which must be made.""

Coloradov. New Mexico I"
The Court further broadened the equitable apportionment doctrine in adjudicating
a controversy over the Vermejo River between Colorado and New Mexico in 1982.
Colorado sought to reallocate water from the headwaters of the Vermejo River, which
New Mexico had fully appropriated. 3 Colorado had never before used Vermejo water
but proposed to use the diverted water for irrigation and various industrial and domestic
purposes." After a district court enjoined Colorado's planned diversion, Colorado
sought Supreme Court apportionment.""
" New Mexico argued that its users
As both states followed prior appropriation,
°
had fully appropriated the Vermejo and that any diversion by Colorado would substantially injure New Mexico's interest.' As such, New Mexico argued that the Court
should strictly apply the rule of priority to preclude Colorado from diverting any water. " ' To counter this argument, Colorado claimed that New Mexico could avoid injury
if it would only make an effort to conserve water. '
Although Colorado filed suit, the Court found that New Mexico, as the state seeking to enjoin diversion, would carry the initial burden to satisfy the substantial injury
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test."' In what amounted to an apparent softening of the substantial injury test, the
Court found that New Mexico could satisfy the injury test simply by proving that "any
diversion by Colorado, unless offset by New Mexico at its own expense, will necessarily
reduce the amount of water available to New Mexico users."" ' Having found that New
Mexico satisfied the substantial injury test, the Court explained that "[tihe burden ...
shifted to Colorado to establish that a diversion should nevertheless be permitted under
the principle of equitable apportionment."2 3 However, the Court ultimately remanded
the case, instructing the Special Master to conduct further research regarding the issue
between the states.14

Coloradov.New Mexico 11H2 '
The Supreme Court returned to the issue over the Vermejo in 1984. Litigating
under essentially the same issues, the Court ultimately denied Colorado's apportionment request.2' However, in doing so, the Court injected an important element into
equitable apportionment doctrinal law-that it "would be willing to sacrifice a comparatively inefficient lesfablished and existing] use for an idealized future use."2 17 Quoting

Colorado v. New Mexico I, the Court noted:
We recognize that the equities supporting the protection of existing economies
will usually be compelling.... Under some circumstances, however, the countervailing equities supporting a diversion for future use in one State may justify
the detriment to existing users in another State. This may be the case, for
example, where the state seeking a diversion demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the benefits of the diversion substantially outweigh the
harm that might result.2 '
Thus, Colorado, which had no established existing use of the Vermejo, could be
granted an apportionment decree if it could (i) establish an ideal future use, and (ii) show
by clear and convincing evidence that New Mexico's existing use was inefficient or unreasonable."9
Ultimately, Colorado failed to carry its burden." Colorado asserted that New Mexico's use of the Vermejo was wasteful and lacked any conservation initiatives; however,
the Court found that Colorado could not prove its assertion by clear and convincing
evidence."' Commenting on Colorado's failure, the Court noted that throughout the
proceedings Colorado had failed to specifically identify "conservation efforts that would
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preserve any of the Vermejo River water supply.""' Moreover, even if Colorado had
identified such efforts, New Mexico would be required to implement conservation
measures only if they were "financially and physically feasible."2 " New Mexico further
damaged Colorado's case by offering evidence that it was in the process of implementing significant conservation measures.' Lastly, the Court found it noteworthy that Colorado provided no evidence that Colorado itself had "undertaken reasonable steps to
minimize the amount of the diversion that Iwould] be required."'

Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon
The latest equitable apportionment case from the West to reach the Supreme
Court seems likely to have a substantial impact on future apportionment litigation. In
the 1983 case, Idaho exrel.Evans v. Oregon, Idaho sought an equitable apportionment
decree of migrating fish on the Columbia-Snake River system.7 Though historically
the Court had only allocated water under the equitable apportionment doctrine, the
Court seemingly broadened the doctrine to cover most if not all natural resources
shared by states: "a State may not preserve solely for its own inhabitants natural resources located within its borders."m Characterizing the migrating fish at issue as a
"natural resource," the Court concluded that the natural resource of migrating fish was
"sufficiently similar" to water such that equitable apportionment was "an appropriate
mechanism for resolving allocative disputes." 2" Accordingly, Idaho was potentially entitled to an equitable share of the benefits provided by the fish of the Snake River System." ' Unfortunately, Idaho was unable to prove a real and substantial injury, and the
Court dismissed the action without prejudice. 3 '
The Supreme Court's equitable apportionment history makes clear that applica-.
tion of the doctrine is intensely fact-specific. However, case law has established some
universal basics of the doctrine. First, a state seeking to enjoin another from diversion
must show by clear and convincing evidence that its substantial interests-principally
those of senior water rights owniers-are being and will continue to be substantially injured." After a showing of substantial injury by the state seeking to enjoin, the burden
shifts to the state seeking to divert.2" The diverting state must then show by clear and
convincing evidence that, after balancing all relevant factors, the benefit to the diverting
state outweighs any harm to the existing users. 3' Some of the notable factors that the

222. Id. at 318.
223. Id. at 319.
224. Id. ("New Mexico submitted substantial evidence that [it] is in the middle of reclamation
project efficiencies and that [it] has taken considerable independent steps-including, the construction, at its own expense and on its own initiative, of a closed stockwater delivery system-to
improve the efficiency of its future water use.").
225. Id. at 320 (quoting Colorado v. New Mexico I, 459 U.S. 176, 186 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
226. Idaho exrel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017 (1983).
227. Id.
at 1018.
228. Id. at 1025 (citations omitted).
229. Id. at 1024.
230. Id.at 1026-27.
231. Id. at 1027-29 ("Idaho has not demonstrated sufficient injury to justify an equitable decree.").
232. Colorado v. New Mexico , 459 U.S. 176, 187 n.13 (1982).
233. Id.
234. Id.
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Court will consider include (i) states' common law doctrines;" (ii) states' established,
existing use of disputed natural resources;"" (iii) states' environmental, industrial, and
anthropogenic interests in the resources; 37 and (iv) the states' natural resource conservation policies.'

IV. APPLYING EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT TO THE ACF BASIN
A. SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE
Procedurally, Florida, as the party seeking equitable apportionment of the ACF
Basin, is only at the beginning of the long process required to obtain an equitable apportionment decree. Beyond the plethora of issues that Special Master Lancaster must
resolve, one of the threshold issues likely to be of relevance at the outset of the litigation
is whether the Supreme Court should exercise original jurisdiction under Article III.'
Although the Court has granted Florida's Motion for Leave to File a Complaint, Georgia may still challenge the Supreme Court's exercise of original jurisdiction." For the
Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction pursuant to Article III, Florida must
convince the Court that (i) the case is of sufficient dignity and seriousness and (ii) there
is no alternative forum that can offer relief.".'
In attacking the Court's exercise of original jurisdiction, Georgia has already argued, and will likely continue to argue, that Florida's action is premature because the
states have yet to exhaust all forums through which to seek relief. ' This assertion rests
primarily upon the fact that Florida has moved to petition the Court before the Corps
has finalized the Buford Project's updated Master Water Control Operating Manual.' 3
In theory, Florida and Georgia may yet achieve relief because the Corps' man-ual may
allocate water in a formula sufficient to appease both states.'" Although such a result
may seem unlikely, there is surely logic in Georgia's claim, especially in light of the
Solicitor General's brief advising the Court to refrain from taking action until completion of the Manual."
To counter this argument, Florida has already asserted in its Complaint that any
manual promulgated by the Corps concerns only the obligation of the agency's duties
under federal law and could not touch on the issue of allocating the water between the
states . " Further, Florida can point to the longevity of the dispute between the states,

235. See, e.g., id. at 184.
236. Id. at 189.

237. Id. at 183.
238. Id.
239. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2., cl.
2.
240. See James E. Pfander, Rethinkiig the Supreme Court's On'inal Jurisdiction in
State-Party Cases, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 555, 566 n.36 (1994) ("The Court has long required parties
who seek to invoke its original jurisdiction to file a petition for leave to do so. The Court typically
exercises its discretion at the threshold of the action, but the question ofjurisdiction remains open
throughout the litigation of the case.")
241. Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992) (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91, 93 (1972)).
242. See Ga. Brief, supra note 122, at 17-25.
243. See id. at l.
244. Seeid. at 20-21.
245. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Florida v. Georgia, No. 142, Orig.
(U.S. filed Sept. 18, 2014).
246. Fl. Complaint, supra note 114, at 4.
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including various attempts at negotiation, interstate compacts, and litigation, as evidence
that there truly is no forum that can settle this dispute." 7 Whether or not the Court
would consider the Corps' future manual as an alternate forum for the parties to seek
relief is unclear. On its face, a written manual does not seem to satisfy the intention
behind the Court's "alternate forum" standard;2U however, the manual arguably provides the parties a "forum" through which they may ultimately find relief. This will be
a difficult issue for the Court to decide.
Additionally, Georgia will surely assert that Florida cannot show sufficient seriousness to merit Supreme Court original jurisdiction, which should be "invoked sparingly."24 9 The Court has generally held that interstate water disputes are cases that fall
within the "sufficient seriousness" requirement."' Florida's claim that Georgia's use of
the ACF Basin will continue to cause injury to the Apalachicola region and the state in
general will likely satisfy the Court that the case is of sufficient seriousness and dignity.
Note, however, that while there is a commonality, the "sufficient seriousness" requirement is separate from the substantial injury requirement under the equitable apportionment doctrine." Thus, even if Florida can show the case is of sufficient seriousness,
Georgia may still argue that Florida has not been substantially injured and does not
deserve an equitable apportionment decree.
One of the more potent arguments Georgia can make in arguing that the Court
should not exercise original jurisdiction is that the Corps is an indispensable party to
the litigation." As an indispensable party, the Corps-a federal agency-could likely
assert sovereign immunity, and unless the Corps waived said immunity the Court would
be forced to dismiss the case in the Corps' absence." Supporting the Corps' status as
an indispensable party, Georgia can point to the Corps' significant involvement in all
aspects of the Tri-State Water dispute."4 More importantly, as Georgia notes in its
Response in Opposition: "[nmo water flows from Georgia into the Apalachicola unless
and until the Corps releases it from Woodruff Dam. Thus, as a practical matter, the
Corps must be involved in any adjudication of Florida's claim, since any resolution of
that claim will need to be implemented by the Corps."' In response, Florida will likely
assert that any decision by the Corps is limited by the scope of their statutory authority
to control the federal dams, and that the heart of the dispute between Florida and Geor-

247. See supraPart 11.
248. Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992).
249. See Ga. Brief, supm note 122, at 13 (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91,
93 (1972)).
250. Grant, supra note 147, at 405.
251. Seeid. at412.
252. See Ga. Brief, iupranote 122, at 3-4.
253. Grant, supra note 147, at 404; see also Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 571-72
(1936). Grant explains:
Although Congress has given blanket statutory consent for joinder of the United States
as a defendant in certain kinds of water disputes, it has not done so for equitable apportionment suits between states. Therefore, if federal interests make the United States
an indispensable party to an apportionment suit and if it does not elect to intervene,
the Court must dismiss the suit.
Grant, supra note 147, at 408 (footnotes removed).
254. See Ga. Brief, supra note 122, at 3-4.
255. Id. at 18.
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gia concerns the water allocation between the states, regardless of the operating standards of any dam.' However, even if Georgia can establish that the Corps is an indispensable party, the United States may simply consent to joinder, allowing the case to
proceed."
The success of any challenges to the Court's original jurisdiction is unclear. A
majority of the decision to either exercise jurisdiction or not would seem to fall on the
Corps and its involvement in the suit.
B. GETTING TO THE SUPREME COURT
For the purposes of this paper, we will assume that any challenge to the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction is dismissed and that the Court has chosen to adjudicate the
dispute under the equitable apportionment doctrine. Florida, as the state seeking to
enjoin diversion, should then bear the initial burden to show injury substantial enough
to warrant consideration of an equitable apportionment. " To carry this burden, Florida
must prove to the Court by clear and convincing evidence that Georgia's water diversion
from the ACF Basin is causing, and will continue to cause, injury to Florida's substantial
interest.25
Early case law indicated that the substantial injury test limits equitable apportionment only to those cases where invasion was of "a serious magnitude."" However, in
Colorado v. New Mexico 11, the Court seemed to soften the standard when it found
that "New Mexico [hadl met its initial burden of showing 'real or substantial injury"'
simply by showing that "'any diversion by Colorado, unless offset by New Mexico at its
own expense, [wouldl necessarily reduce the amount of water available to New Mexico
users.' ' 6' If the Court holds Florida to the substantial injury test as outlined in Colorado
v. New Mexico I, it seems likely that the state would pass the test. Florida need only
show that "'any diversion by [Georgia], unless offset by [Florida] at its own expense,
[would] necessarily reduce the amount of water available to [Florida] users.
Even if the Court requires a heavier burden to prove substantial injury than in Colorado v. NewMexico I, Florida may still be able to shoulder the burden. In its Complaint, Florida asserted that Georgia's ACF Basin consumption has caused, and will
continue to cause, Florida irreparable economic, environmental, and socioeconomic
harm by diminishing freshwater flow to the Apalachicola Bay." As evidence of this
harm, Florida may only need to point to the recent collapse of the Apalachicola Bay
oyster fishery. Historically, the Apalachicola ecosystem provided one of the most productive oyster fisheries in the Gulf region.' The freshwater from the Apalachicola
River, fed by ACF Basin water, created an ideal estuarine environment for oysters: low
salinity and high nutrients.'
However, reduced freshwater flow from the ACF Basin

256. Fl. Brief, supra note 113, at 4.
257. See Grant, supranote 147, at 408.
258. Colorado v. NewMexico 1, 459 U.S. 176, 187 n.13 (1982).
259. Idaho exrel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1027 (1983).
260. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669, 674 (1931) (dismissing Connecticut's bill of complaint without prejudice for failure to show that its substantial interest had
been or would be injured by Massachusetts' diversion of the Connecticut River).
261. Colorado v. New Mexico II, 467 U.S. 310, 317 (1984) (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Colorado v. NewMexico , 459 U.S. at 187 n.13).
262. Id. (third alteration in original).
263. Fl. Complaint, supra note 114, at 15-21.
264. Id. at 12.
265. Fl. Brief, supra note 113, app. at 37 (declaration of Paul A. Montagna, Ph.D.).
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into the Apalachicola Bay has modified the estuary into a high salinity, low nutrient
environment." As a result, oysters and various other estuarine species have suffered
adverse effects." 7
Before the freshwater flow to the bay diminished, Apalachicola oysters accounted
for upwards of "12 percent of the nation's harvest of Eastern Oysters,"' and represented a nearly seventy million dollar industry each year. 69 However, 2012 oyster production in the Apalachicola region was at a twenty-year low, "resultling] in the U.S.
Department of Commerce land NOAAI declaring [Apalachicola oystersl a commercial
fishery failure."2" As the declaration attests, "Ithe surrounding economy suffered se271
vere contraction" and has yet to recover.
Note, however, that the oysters' importance is not limited to commercial value.
Oyster habitats produce important ecosystem services such as "sediment stabilization,
erosion control, shoreline protection, storm surge absorption, critical habitat for other
27
estuarine species, and water quality enhancement by particle and nutrient removal." 1
It follows that oyster habitat loss could have extremely detrimental consequences on the
rest of the Apalachicola ecosystem and environment.
Though the harm to Apalachicola's oyster fishery may represent the most compelling evidence that Florida has suffered real and substantial harm, the damage to the
industry is by no means Florida's only injury resulting from reduced flow into the state.
In its Complaint and Brief, Florida claimed that the change in the bay has resulted in
harm (i) to other important fisheries such as shrimp, crab, and finfish; (ii) to the bay's
tourist and recreational industry; (iii) to other wildlife and their habitat; and (iv) to the
unique socio-cultural community of the region. 72
Georgia's Answer will surely assert that Florida cannot pass the substantial injury
test. In doing so, Georgia will presumably stand by and bolster those arguments made
in its Response in Opposition to Florida's Motion for Leave, many of which the Solicitor General supported. " For instance, Georgia has continued to assert that Florida
mischaracterized the evidence used to support its claim and that the facts actually show
that Florida has not suffered any injury "plausibly connected" to actions by Georgia. 5
Georgia will claim that any harm suffered in the Apalachicola Bay is due to fishery
mismanagement and natural climactic occurrences, not Georgia's freshwater use. 76
This argument may carry weight, as Georgia returns "roughly 70%" of the water it uses
from the ACF Basin to downstream users.2" Georgia is also likely to attack Florida's
claim that Georgia is responsible for the recent collapse of the Apalachicola oyster industry. " Florida seeks to reduce Georgia water usage to 1992 levels; however, this date

266. Id. app. at 37-38.
267. Id. app. at 38.
268. Id. at 6.
269. Watt, supra note 142, at 1455.
270. Fl. Brief, supra note 113, at 20.
271. Id.
272. Id. app. at 38.
273. Id. at 6.
274. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22-23, Florida v. Georgia, No. 142,
Orig. (U.S. filed Sept. 18, 2014).
275. See Ga. Brief, supra note 122, at 28-29.
276. Id.at 26-27, 29-30.
277. Id. at 26.
278. Id.at 28-30.
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seems to have no rational relation to low oyster harvests in the past decade. 9 Noting
that Florida must show substantial injury by clear and convincing evidence, Georgia has
already asserted in its Response in Opposition that,"Florida's attempts to attribute the
2012-2013 low oyster harvest to Georgia's upstream water usage do not even cross the
line between possibility and plausibility necessary for an ordinary complaint filed in
district court," and should be dismissed.'
Throughout equitable apportionment case law, the Supreme Court has held that
harm to economic, environmental, and socioeconomic interests may warrant Supreme
Court equitable apportionment adjudication. 8 ' If Florida can provide sufficient evidence to support the assertions put forward in its Complaint and Brief, it seems likely
that the Court will find Florida satisfied the substantial injury test. However, Georgia
can poke significant holes in Florida's case that Florida must carefully plug before the
Court will exercise its original jurisdiction.
C. BALANCING THE FACTORS
If the Supreme Court decides that the Tri-State Dispute warrants apportionment,
it would be the Court's first major equitable apportionment case in decades. 8 Assuming the Court finds that Florida can show substantial injury, equitable apportionment
case law indicates that the Court would proceed to weigh and balance "all the factors
which create equities in favor of one State or the other.". Because the equitable apportionment doctrine application tends to be intensely fact-specific, the factors the
Court would consider would be unique to this ACF Basin dispute. Analyzing "all the
factors which create equities in favor of one State or the other" is beyond the scope of
this paper. However, equitable apportionment case law has established relevant factors:
(i) the states' water laws," ' (ii)the states' existing and planned water uses, " (iii) the likely
damage to either state if changes in allocation occur, 1 (iv) the extent to which reasonable conservation measures have been and could be employed to reduce potential damage,8 and (v) the potential environmental implications of allocation. " These factors
are considered in more detail below.
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1. The Water Laws of the States
The Supreme Court has established that, while important, the water law of the
litigating states is only one of many factors to consider in equitable apportionment jurisprudence." Georgia follows a form of riparian law." In contrast, Florida follows what
could be called a hybrid system of water rights, "which blends the 'reasonable use' riparian system with elements of prior appropriation."" The Supreme Court has yet to
adjudicate an equitable apportionment decision with a hybrid state. Moreover, all recent equitable apportionment decisions have involved states with the same, if not substantially similar, water law schemes."m It follows that accepting a case involving a hybrid
state and a riparian state would present a novel question to the Court.
Whether the Court characterizes Florida's water law as a new hybrid system or
focuses more on the riparian aspects may affect the Court's final decision. On the one
hand, Florida law seems to indicate that the state abides by the hybrid doctrine," and
perhaps the Court should respect the hybrid form as such. On the other hand, the
Court may find it significant that Florida's hybrid system does not "place as much emphasis on priority in time as does the western model of prior appropriation." 4 Furthermore, neither Florida's Complaint nor its Brief assert the state's right to the ACF Basin's
water based on prior appropriation; rather, the Complaint and Brief seem to invoke
riparian law's focus on reasonable use.' If the Court characterizes Florida's law as a
hybrid doctrine, the effect on the equitable apportionment analysis is unclear. However, if the Court characterizes Florida as a riparian state, Supreme Court case law may
indicate the significance placed on Georgia and Florida's water law doctrines relative to
apportionment.
Historically, the Court has developed equitable apportionment in relation to prior
appropriation states more than those states with riparian water systems; the explanation
for this is twofold. First, the Court has simply presided over more cases involving prior

289. Colorado v. New Mexico , 459 U.S. at 183-84 ("The laws of the contending states concerning intrastate water disputes are an important consideration governing equitable apportionment.... But state law is not controlling.").
290. Stephenson, supra note 139, at 92.
291. Id. A detailed analysis of Florida's hybrid water law system is beyond the scope of this
paper, but as explained by Dustin Stephenson:
[glenerally, hybrid systems recognize riparian rights, while also implementing an administrative permit mechanism for new demands placed on water resources.... In
Florida, new permit applicants must meet a three-prong test to be granted a water use
permit: the use must be defined as a reasonable beneficial use, the use must not adversely affect other riparian users, and the use must be consistent with the public interest.
Id. It is noteworthy, however, that hybrid systems tend not to "place as much emphasis on priority
in time as does the western model of prior appropriation." Id.
292. The last major equitable apportionment case between states with significantly different
common law water schemes was also the first major equitable apportionment case: Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). Since this case-decided in 1907--the doctrine has gone through
significant changes as outlined above. See supra Part III.C.
293. See generally Frank E. Maloney et al., f oidas "ReasonableBeneficial" Water Use
Standard:Have Eastand West Met?, 31 U. FRA. L. REv. 253 (1979) (surveying Florida's hybrid
riparian/prior appropriation common law water scheme).
294. Stephenson, supra note 139, at 92.
295. See, e.g., Fl. Brief, supranote 113, at 14 (invoking Florida's right to a fair distribution of
the water from the ACF Basin rooted in reasonableness rather than priority in time).
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appropriation states than riparian states.' Secondly, riparian law's focus on reasonable
use harmonizes well with equitable apportionment's doctrinal goal of equitizing benefits, meaning the Court is seldom called upon to analyze riparian equitable apportionment.
If the Court determines that Florida follows riparian law, the case of NewJersey v.
New York, could provide guidance on how the Court should rde."' In NewJersey v.
New York, a case between two riparian states, the Court found that New York could
not divert water from the Delaware River over a specified amount because it would
interfere with NewJersey's reasonable river use. 8 Commentators have described New
Jersey v. New York as a "rather straightforward application of riparian law."" Florida
likely has a valid argument that Georgia's diversions have interfered and will continue
to interfere with Florida's reasonable ACF Basin water use. If the ACF Court follows
NewJersey v.New Yorks logic by adhering closely to riparian-law, then Florida would
likely be entitled to equitable apportionment.' Of course, Florida needs to prove causation, correlation, and harm before it could obtain apportionment."'
Whether or not Florida asserts its rights by prior apportionment, riparian law, or a
hybrid of both, it is likely that Florida and Georgia's water law doctrines will be important, but not determinative factors in the case. As the Court has explained multiple
times, the states' water law doctrines are not controlling, rather, "the effort always is to
secure an equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas."" °
2. The Existence of Established Use
Fundamental to all equitable apportionment case law is the balance between the
benefit gained by the state diverting natural resources and the detriment suffered by the
state losing natural resources."*' Here, both Florida and Georgia can make a compelling
case that each state's existing ACF Basin water use is well established and deserves protection.
Florida will likely assert that the state has long utilized ACF Basin waters to the
benefit of the Apalachicola Bay. As noted in Florida's Brief, "[slettlers established the
port City of Apalachicola in the early nineteenth century. The economy and way of life
those early settlers created has flourished for generations and has always depended on
the environmental health of the River and Bay."3° ' Inherent in Florida's desire to protect existing economic use of the bay is the state's interest in preserving the Apalachicola
environment and ecosystem. Though the Court previously found that existing environmental use warrants protection," itis unclear just how much weight the Court would

296. See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-43, 345 (1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931). NewJersey v. New York and Connecticut v. Massachusetts are
the only two major equitable apportionment decisions involving riparian states.
297. NewJersey,283 U.S. at 342-43.
298. Id. at 346.
299. Dellapenna, supra note 140, at 887; Lathrop, supra note 84, at 897; Natasha Meruelo,
Considenlnga Cooperative Water ManagementApproach i Resolving the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Hint River Basin Water War,18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 335,355 (2007).
300. See NewJersey,283 U.S. at 343.
301. See Colorado v.NewMeico II,
467 U.S. 310, 316, 321 (1984).
302. NewJersey,283 U.S. at 343.
303. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
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provide Florida's environmental interests. Those interests include (i) protecting various
endangered species,"" (ii) maintaining federally protected conservation reserves, 7 and
(iii) protecting the unique ecosystem in general. An equitable apportionment case between Florida and Georgia "would be the first major interstate apportionment case the
Court has entertained in the age of mature environmental statutory law."" 8 As the importance of environmental consciousness grows, some commenters argue that the
Court ought to provide more weight to states' existing environmental use.'
Conversely, Georgia will likely assert that Florida cannot show sufficient existing
use; as Georgia notes in its Response in Opposition: "Florida does not claim that its
citizens are being deprived of water for drinking, domestic, agricultural, or other consumptive uses. ""' ° On the other hand, Georgia municipalities have depended on the
ACF Basin's water supply since state establishment. Georgia describes the issue between the states as "man vs. mussels," " and it will surely emphasize its interest in supplying potable water to its residents.' Georgia is most likely to stress the dire need for
anthropogenic water supply throughout the state, especially in Atlanta, which continues
to grow at a swift rate."3 Failure to supply enough river water to Atlanta could result in
the city's economic stagnation. " ' As one of the largest and most productive cities in the
nation, Atlanta's injury could potentially cause a ripple effect felt throughout the entire
southeastern region, if not the country." ' Georgia can also point to the Eleventh Circuit's holding that water supply was an authorized purpose of the Buford Project as
further support that Georgia's existing ACF Basin use warrants protection.' °
Ultimately, the Court must determine whether Florida's economic, environmental,
and ecological interests are comparable to Georgia's interest in supplying water to its
residents. While the Court's holding in New Jersey v. New York seemed to indicate
that environmental interests warrant equitable apportionment protection,' 7 the facts of

oyster populations).
306. Some of the endangered or threatened species that have been known to inhabit the Apalachicola region include the West Indian manatee, the Indiana bat, the gray bat, some twenty species of bird, the Georgia blind salamander, the American alligator, the gopher frog, the gopher
tortoise, the Barbour's map turtle, the alligator snapping turtle, the Atlantic Ridley sea turtle, the
green sea turtle, the leatherback sea turtle, the Atlantic loggerhead turtle, the eastern indigo snake,
the Atlantic sturgeon, the Bluestripe shiner, the shoal bass, and over one hundred plant species.
See ApalachicolaNationalEstuanneResearch Reserve, supra note 12.
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that case did not require the Court to balance environmental interests of one state with
another state's interest in supplying potable water to its residents.
3. Conservation
In Colorado v. New Mexico I, the Court explained that conservation should factor
into future equitable apportionment case law: "We have invoked equitable apportionment not only to require the reasonable efficient use of water, but also to impose on
States an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to conserve and augment the water
supply of an interstate stream.". 8 Declaring its right to Vermejo River water, Colorado
asserted that New Mexico could offset any harms from the diversion through conservation measures." 9 As a result, the Court held in Colorado v. New Mexico Ithat if Colorado could prove that conservation measures could offset the harm to New Mexico by
clear and convincing evidence, equitable apportionment may be warranted."'
Ultimately, Colorado was unable to shoulder the burden put forth by the Court." '
As such, it is unclear exactly how a state could carry the burden to show that conservation can offset harm from diversion. However, the Court did provide a list of Colorado's failures it found notable: (i) failure to provide evidence that it had taken
reason33
able steps to minimize the amount of water required in its planned diversion;
(ii) inability to prove that New Mexico's conservation measures were inefficient;33 and
(iii) inability to identify financially and physically feasible conservation efforts that New
Mexico could apply to preserve water supply. ' From these failures, it is possible to
speculate just how conservation would factor into the equitable apportionment of the
ACF Basin.
First, it is important to note that in Colorado v. New Mexico I, Colorado asserted
that conservation measures could offset harm to New Mexico."'5 In Georgia's Response
in Opposition to Florida's Motion, the state only indirectly mentions conservation issues, and as such, it is unclear exactly how conservation will factor into the potential
equitable apportionment case. Georgia may be wise to bring the conservation issue to
the Court. As the state seeking diversion, proving adequate conservation measures can
provide Georgia with a method to convince the Court that the diversion benefit substantially outweighs the harm to Florida.3 On the other hand, Georgia may want to
avoid the conservation issue all together, as the state, and Atlanta especially, will likely
need to increase water usage in the near future. 7 Ultimately, conservation is likely to
be a relevant factor whether or not Georgia brings this factor to the Court's attention.
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The Court held in Colorado v. New Meico Ithat it would not protect waste or inefficient water use."' Further, Florida attacked Georgia's inefficient water usage in its Complaint and Brief, likely indicating that conservation will be an important aspect in the
dispute.3 '2
In its Complaint and Brief, Florida attacked Georgia for its "massive and unchecked storage and consumption" of water."' Spec ifically, Florida pointed to Georgia's massive 360 mgd withdrawal from the Chattahoochee River for industrial and municipal purposes alone." Though a portion of the withdrawal supplies Atlanta and
other cities with drinking water, Florida notes that other uses include car washes, lawn
watering, and supply for paper mills, water parks, golf courses, and other recreational
purposes.3" Florida also asserted that Atlanta's "lost or unaccounted for water"-water
lost to transmission and conveyance-exceeds national standards.'
What's more, by
Georgia's own projections, municipal and industrial water supply needs could double
by 2040, exceeding 705 nigd."'s Note also that Georgia's cities are not the only ACF
Basin water consumers: current estimates measure that for agricultural purposes, Georgia "allows 879 square miles to be irrigated with the Flint River water."'
If Georgia is to convince the Court that adequate conservation measures exist that
can protect the ACF Basin, it must prove this proposition by clear and convincing evidence."" In its Response, Georgia has already attacked much of Florida's claim that
Georgia uses an exorbitant amount of ACF Basin water. Georgia accused Florida of
misusing information,"3 alleging that Florida had failed to include key factors in its Complaint and Brief." For example, Florida claims that Georgia's use of over 360 mgd of
ACF water is excessive; however, this fails to take into account that Georgia returns
some seventy percent of that water for use downstream. 9 Similarly, Florida's analysis
of Georgia's projected withdrawal of over 705 mgd by 2040 fails to take into account
that those same projections estimated a return of seventy-eight percent (or 550 mgd) to
downstream users."'
Moreover, Georgia can point to various initiatives and projects in recent years that
seem to indicate an increased emphasis on the importance of conservation throughout
the state."' For instance, in June 2010 the governor signed the Georgia Water Stewardship Act of 2010 into law." Georgia promulgated this Act just after a severe 2009
drought ended, and its purpose was "to demonstrate Georgia's deep commitment to
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the conservation of critical freshwater supplies." " ' Among other things, the act (i) requires high efficiency plumbing in all new residential and commercial construction;
(ii) created the Joint Committee on Water Supply to study new opportunities for enhancing water supply; and (iii) requires public water systems to conduct annual water
loss audits. " In 2011 Georgia also invested three hundred million dollars in the Govemor's Water Supply Program, designed to fund critical and cost effective water supply
projects." Georgia will likely claim that efforts such as these have reduced the water
amount it has used from the ACF Basin in recent years. There is also evidence that per
capita water use in metro Atlanta and the surrounding counties has decreased in recent
years."' A 2011 study conducted by the Metropolitan North Georgia Water Planning
District found that although Georgia's population continues to increase, "[i ndividual
7
water use dropped from about 149 gallons per day in 2000 to 102 gallons in 2009.""'
Even if Georgia can prove the effectiveness of its conservation initiatives, a major
obstacle in its way is Florida's impressive conservation track record, which should factor
into the Court's conservation analysis."" Florida has long been a "national frontrunner
'
in reclaiming water I... reusling] more water than any other state. "" In 2010 alone,
"Florida conserved more than 121 billion gallons of fresh potable quality water and
replenished more than 80 billion gallons of recycled water back into aquifers as a result
of water reuse."" ° Further, Florida arguably has no duty to conserve water from the
ACF Basin. Florida does not seek to divert water, it only wants a more natural flow
restored to the Apalachicola River and Bay. Thus, Florida's water demand stems from
its natural environment and ecosystems needs, not anthropogenic water supply.
Another hurdle that Georgia, and Atlanta specifically, must overcome is the unfortunate truth that Atlanta is simply a city situated without a sufficient water source.3' In
fact, Metropolitan Atlanta has the smallest watershed of any major metropolitan area in
the United States." Only about one thousand square miles of land lie in the watershed
above Lake Lanier to capture the rainwater and send it downstream.a If Atlanta continues to grow, it would seem that no amount of conservation could prevent harm to
states south of Georgia that depend on the basin's water.
At present, the conservation factor likely weighs in Florida's favor. There does not
seem to be any way that Georgia can show that Florida's current conservation measures
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are unreasonable or inefficient. Though Georgia has recently implemented various
conservation initiatives, it is unclear how the Court would view the significance of the
steps taken. Further, the Court may simply find that Georgia's efforts are too little and
too late to compensate for the existing harm Florida has suffered as a result of Georgia's
previous water usage.
Though the conservation factor likely weighs in Florida's favor, it is important to
note that Colorado v.New Mexico Iand Iland the potential suit between Florida and
Georgia are distinguishable in two important ways. First, Colorado v. New Mexico I
and II involved two prior appropriation states," whereas the current case involves a
riparian and a hybrid state. Second, in Colorado v. New Mexico I and II, the state
seeking to divert water sought equitable apportionment,"' whereas in the current dispute
the state seeking to enjoin diversion seeks equitable apportionment. These differences
are important because Colorado's failure to prove adequate conservation measures essentially doomed its case. ' Under prior appropriation law, Colorado had no right to
the water it sought to divert, and when Colorado was unable to show that conservation
could offset the harm to the senior user New Mexico, the court dismissed the case.""
However, in the ACF dispute there is no argument that Georgia is entitled to at least
some portion of the ACF Basin's water. Further, Georgia is not the petitioning state
here. Thus, if the Court finds that the conservation issue tips in Florida's favor, it would
not likely dismiss the case.

4. Relevance of the'Tri-State Water Wars History
If the Court were to preside over the equitable apportionment between the states,
it is unlikely that the twenty-year procedural history surrounding the Tri-State Water
Wars would go unnoticed. 8 While a complete historical recapitulation is unnecessary
here, two procedural elements are highly likely to be relevant: (i) the ACF Compact's
failure and (ii) the Eleventh Circuit's decision in In re MDL-1824 Ti-State Water

Rights Litgation.
Frankly, the ACF Compact may have been doomed from the start, as it required
unanimous consent on an allocation formula between all parties. " However, both Florida and Georgia will point fingers and claim that the other was primarily responsible for
the compact's failure. Georgia will likely claim that it attempted in good faith to address
Florida's economic, environmental, and ecological concerns by offering to establish a
minimum flow to the Apalachicola River." Florida rejected Georgia's proposal, which
came just before the compact dissolved, after which Florida subsequently dropped out
of negotiations and made its first threat to bring the issue to the Supreme Court."
Florida, on the other hand, will likely assert that the compact negotiations were
compromised "Idjue in large part to ... secret negotiations between the Corps and
Georgia concerning issues Florida had reason to believe would be addressed in good
faith solely within the ACF Compact negotiations." ' Moreover, Florida can assert that
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it was within its right to reject the minimum flow proposal, as the state has been firm in
its demand for a natural flow down to the Apalachicola Bay.' Exactly how the Court
would factor the failed compact into the equitable apportionment analysis is unclear.
However, if the Court were to find that one state was unreasonable in refusing to negotiate or even acted in bad faith while negotiating, it may weigh negatively against that
party.
Despite the failed compact, Georgia will surely assert that the Eleventh Circuit's In
re MDL-1824 Ti-State Water Raghts Litigation decision firmly cemented the state's
right to use water from Lake Lanier and the Chattahoochee River."" Because the Eleventh Circuit found that water supply was an authorized purpose of the Buford Project,
Georgia will likely argue that it has every right to that project's water.' To counter this
argument, Florida has already asserted in its Complaint that the litigation did not touch
on the issue of allocating the water between the states; rather, the litigation was concerned with the Corps' various obligations under federal statute."'6 Thus, Florida explained, "Itihe [Eleventh Circuiti litigation did not, and could not, address the fundamental problem facing Florida-Georgia's ever-increasing storage and use of water that
has historically nourished the Apalachicola Region." 7 Further, Florida can point to the
fact that both courts in the MDL case failed to address any and all "phase two" environmental issues at stake.w
In reality, the Tri-State Water Wars litigation has not reached a conclusion, as the
Corps is still in the process of researching the proper water amount that it can supply
to Georgia." How will the Eleventh Circuit's holding affect equitable apportionment
law? Perhaps the Court will find that the Eleventh Circuit's ruling weighs in Georgia's
favor. Taken to its logical conclusion, the decision indicates that the water Georgia
seeks to divert is contained in a project, an authorized purpose of which is to supply
Georgia with water. Contrarily, the opinion left a great deal of discretion to the Corps
to determine how much water could be and should be supplied to Georgia, and the
Corps is a good ways away from coming to a final decision.
V. CONCLUSION
So who wins? At this stage, it is simply impossible to predict a "winner" in a potential equitable apportionment suit between the states. Superficially, many factors the
Court has historically considered important seem to weigh in Florida's favor. The decrease in freshwater flow to the Apalachicola Bay seems to have injured Florida and this
injury seems at some level to stem from Georgia's interference with Florida's reasonable
use of the ACF Basin. Further, Georgia's water usage and conservation policies, although recently improving, may not be enough to offset the harm Florida has already
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experienced due to lack of water. However, the Tri-State litigation history may weigh
in Georgia's favor. The Court may also find Georgia's "Man v. Mussel" position perisuasive.
Perhaps a more important question than who will win is whether anyone can truly
win. Florida seeks flow levels at least equivalent to those in 1992 to help revitalize the
injured Apalachicola region. Georgia wants a yet unspecified amount of water to keep
its citizens hydrated and its state afloat. Meanwhile, Alabama will surely assert its right
to water from the basin. Clearly there is insufficient water to keep all parties happybut what if there is not enough water to keep anybody happy?

